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Logical Forms in Wit
Abstract
This paper presents a preliminary theory for the
logical structure underlying a certain class of jokes
and witty comments. We show that there is a range
of jokes which can be understood as intentionally
poor speech acts (where the intention is conveyed
by a variety of means, including nonsense, parody
and self-reference). Constructing such utterances
typically requires intelligence and creativity. Hence
jokes may have evolved (via mate-selection forces)
as a way of demonstrating mental fitness.
The goal of this work is both improving our under-
standing of humour (via formal theories of jokes),
and techniques for the computer recognition and
generation of jokes. It therefore focuses on struc-
tures that require relatively little world-knowledge.
We identify several logical forms that give rise
to jokes, and show how these forms correspond
to violations of ‘the rules of good speech’ (e.g.
Grice’s Maxims). As a result of this analysis,
several algorithms are proposed for joke genera-
tion. These algorithms have yet to be implemented
and tested. Hopefully though, they will extend
computer-generation to a wider range of jokes.
1 Introduction
Laughter is an intrinsically human thing. Comedy plays an
important role in social relations, and a sense of humour is a
key part of a person’s character. An A.I. theory of humour is
therefore an attractive goal. Firstly, for the light it could shed
on this interesting aspect of human behaviour. Also, the abil-
ity to make and recognise jokes could aid Human Computer
Interaction (HCI) in many areas.
Creativity is key to humour. One might suppose that a hu-
morous A.I. could be created by storing examples, coupled
with techniques1 for assessing input (for joke recognition)
or selecting jokes relevant to the current context (for gener-
ation). This is unlikely to work well at either task (at least,
1For example, a statistical text comparison, such as HAL, be-
tween recent dialogue and the text of known jokes could be used for
both tasks.
not for long on any one human). Originality is an important
part of humour.2 and jokes quickly go stale.3
This paper presents preliminary investigations on logical
forms in wit, which we define to be those jokes characterised
by ingenuity or verbal skill. We focus on abstract forms of
joke, which may be more amenable to computer generation.
We will identify several logical forms that give rise to jokes.
These then suggest algorithms for joke generation – although
these have yet to be implemented and tested.
1.1 Disclaimer
We do not attempt to give a full theory of humour, or even of
one aspect of humour, but merely to identify some forms of
joke which seem suitable for computational recognition and
generation. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a complete the-
ory of humour is possible. As Minsky observes, “One might
suppose [the difficulty in defining what a joke is] is a mere
surface difficulty, and hope that we may yet find a single un-
derlying structure from which all funny things spring – some
basic ‘grammar of humour’ or ‘comical deep structure’. Not
so, I fear; when we look deeper for that underlying structure
of humour we shall still find a vexing lack of unity. I argue
that this is a consequence of the way things usually evolve in
biology.... [In] structures created by evolution, we find that
only rarely does one evolutionary increment serve a single
purpose... Behaviour emerges from a network of interdepen-
dent mechanisms, and one cannot expect any compactly cir-
cumscribed theory (or mechanism) completely to ‘explain’
any single surface component of behaviour.”[10]
2 Background
2.1 Speculation
The purpose and origins of humour are beyond the scope of
this paper. Nevertheless, we indulge here in some speculation
which will inform the formal work that follows.
2Hence Sheridan’s insult “The right honourable gentleman is in-
debted to his memory for his jests, and to his imagination for his
facts.”
3Whilst there is a lot of similarity between many jokes, this is
typically disguised as much as possible. Strangely though, an ‘old
favourite’ may remain funny – as long as it is not presented as a new
joke.
Jokes serve both social and psychological roles, such as
mockery, easing tensions and relief. It is these roles that are
usually the focus of theories of humour (which [11] groups
into the superiority, relief, & incongruity theories). However
these roles could be served without jokes by simpler mecha-
nisms, and indeed often are – c.f. Provine’s study of laughter
in everyday conversation, where very little observed laughter
was actually related to jokes[13]. Hence these roles cannot
explain the cleverness and imagination found in jokes.
Good thought vs. Poor Thought
Alexander Pope offers the following explanation: “True wit is
nature to advantage dressed, What oft was thought, but ne’er
so well expressed”.[12] According to this view, wit displays
ingenuity by definition, since it is intelligent elegant commu-
nication.
More recently, Marvin Minsky proposed the opposite
view, that jokes are a device for teaching “fallacies in daily
life”.[10] According to Minsky, the role of humour is to
help learn these things. Minsky also hypothesises that hu-
mour is mainly about taboos and the nonsensical, because our
mind uses censors to suppress unproductive mental states and
analogies to accelerate cognition. Thus, he says, humour ful-
fils a function of helping us in “recognising and suppressing
bugs – ineffective or destructive thought processes.”
A case can be made for either view, but in fact neither with-
stands too much scrutiny.
Whilst jokes typically display a sophisticated use of lan-
guage, this is not because they are the epitome of commu-
nication. Jokes do often centre on accepted truths, and are
frequently used to make a point in debate. However if jokes
appear in text-books or lectures, it is to lighten the tone, rather
than convey complex information. As Minsky observes, jokes
can often involve false ideas, fallacious reasoning, nonsense
and taboo-breaking. However Minsky’s view that their pur-
pose is to teach these things is backwards: To appreciate such
a joke, we must already understand that the joke represents
fallacy, nonsense, or taboo-breaking. A joke that taught these
things would not be funny.
Humour as posture and pose
Perhaps the key aspect of a joke is that it demonstrates men-
tal dexterity. We speculate that this was the original purpose
of jokes: making jokes (and to a lesser extent, understand-
ing jokes) is a way of demonstrating mental fitness. Thus a
good sense of humour is evidence of a good brain, and hence
the development of jokes may have been driven by the evolu-
tionary force of mate selection4. We call this the showing-off
theory of humour, and put it forward as an explanation for the
ingenuity often seen in jokes. The primary prediction of this
theory is that jokes should be difficult to form (something
which is not predicted – and indeed is counter-productive –
under other theories). This explains humorous songs, which
are usually funnier than the same jokes would be if told in
a prose style – even though rhythm & rhyme have no direct
connection to humour.
4The process whereby a trait develops not for its direct survival
value, but as a way of publicly demonstrating general fitness – which
attracts a mate, thereby perpetuating the gene responsible.[16]
2.2 Computational approaches to humour
There has been a lot of informal analysis of what is funny
written by comedians. However there has been very little
work done on this topic from an A.I./computational perspec-
tive. We give a very brief overview of that work here; for a
more detailed study, see [11].
There are a number of systems that use computers to
produce comedy. Most of these systems work by ran-
domly mangling text (e.g. The Dialectizer by S.Stoddard
at http://rinkworks.com/dialect/) or randomly combining text
fragments (e.g. The Postmodernism Generator by A.Bulhak
at http://www.elsewhere.org/cgi-bin/postmodern/). In either
case, humorous nonsense is created in a particular style. The
results can be very funny. However these systems are not
steps on the way to computational humour. They do not con-
tain a model of humour, have no ability to recognise humour,
and require considerable hand-coding of rules to create. Such
systems embody the creativity of their author, rather than giv-
ing creativity to the computer.
Koestler put forward the theory that humour stems from
sudden shifts in perspective.[6] These perspective shifts are
often linked with shifts in status (e.g. disguised insults)
or breaking taboos (e.g. where a sexual meaning is sud-
denly revealed). This is a general but powerful theory. It
encompasses the influential incongruity-resolution theory of
humour, where jokes consist of creating and then resolving
incongruities[11]. It also encompasses the surprise theory,
where jokes hinge on generating expectations, then deliber-
ately breaking them. A broken expectation is one form of
perspective shift.
There is a ‘General Theory of Verbal Humour’ (GTVH)
in the literature. Ritchie states in [14] that the GTVH is more
developed than any other theory, but still “no more than a very
early draft”. The GTVH identifies several aspects of humour.
In the terms of the GTVH, this paper identifies a collection of
forms in the Logical Mechanism of jokes. We acknowledge
the importance of the other aspects of the GTVH, but do not
attempt to model them here.
The most concrete work on computational humour is that
done by Kim Binstead and Graham Ritchie. They looked
at jokes based on ambiguity, and identified puns as a com-
putationally tractable class of jokes (given current elec-
tronic resources).[1] This resulted in the JAPE pun-generator,
which produces riddle-puns that fit into the incongruity-
resolution theory. The jokes we examine do not fit under
the incongruity-resolution theory, but do fit under Koestler’s
more general theory. They use a quite abstract type of per-
spective shift: from normal communication to poor commu-
nication.
3 Intentionally Poor Communication
Wit is a verbal form of humour, which suggests there may
be connections to dialogue forms. We will explore here the
idea that one class of wit (c.f. §1.1) is related to poor speech.
Initially this seems strange: Wit is perhaps the very oppo-
site of poor speech. Yet as we will show, it often involves
breaking the rules of good speech. Wit is made challeng-
ing by the constraint that the utterance should be surprisingly
poor. Typically this is achieved by initially looking normal,
whilst signalling an intention to be ridiculous (i.e. wit con-
sists of cleverly disguised obviously poor speech). Parallels
exist here with deliberate comic stupidity, and the deliberate
clumsiness of clowning.
This intention forms an interesting but vague constraint. It
can be conveyed in a wide range of ways: by tone of voice
(e.g. sarcasm), by context, by the character of the speaker (or
in the case of mockery, the character of the target), by contrast
with similar well-known utterances, by cross-reference, by
self-reference, or by the artfulness of the joke’s construction.
The unifying factor seems to be that all of these signs dis-
tinguish the joke from a genuinely poor utterance. Note that
context and character loosely correspond to the GTVH ele-
ments of Situation and Target. Situation and target also have
an important effect on how funny a joke is (and to whom),
which we will not examine here.
3.1 Examples: Breaking Grice’s maxims
Grice’s maxims are a well-respected list of rules for
speech.[4] They represent an unwritten contract between
speaker and listener, and are used in natural-language pro-
cessing to explain the selection of what to say and what to
omit, and how the listener arrives at the correct interpreta-
tion. Below we list Grice’s maxims, plus example jokes that
break them.
Maxim of Quantity:
1. Make your contribution to the conversation as informa-
tive as necessary.
Example joke that breaks this rule:
Pres: You understand the reasons for absolute se-
crecy?
Agent: Yes – but can you tell me nothing at all
about my mission?5
Here intention is conveyed by the similarity to a familiar
situation (secret agent adventures).
2. Do not make your contribution to the conversation more
informative than necessary.
Jewish Mother: Help, help! My son, the doctor is
drowning!6
Note how intention is conveyed in this joke by the targeting
of a well-known stereotype.
Maxim of Quality:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
The Maxim of Quality is out of place in Grice’s Maxims,
since it is not a rule of conversation so much as a rule of
good behaviour. Nevertheless, there are jokes based around
violating this maxim. Some use contradictions, others use
obvious lies:
Farmer: Who’s out there?
Chicken Thief: Nobody here but us chickens.6
5Donald Westlake
6Source unknown.
Captain Renault: What brought you to Casablanca?
Rick: My health. I came to Casablanca for the wa-
ters.
Captain Renault: The waters? What waters? We’re
in the desert.
Rick: I was misinformed. 7
There is a type of joke resembling this 2nd example which
should be easy to generate. If an A.I. agent is given a question
where either the answer is obvious or the agent does not wish
to answer, then a sarcastic false answer will constitute a witty
reply, especially if nonsensical. E.g.
Q: Are you a machine?
A: No I’m a new type of flamingo.
Nonsense of this form should be easy to generate; the only
hard constraints are that the answer be of the correct gram-
matical type (e.g. Noun Phrase or Verb Phrase, depending on
the question), and not be relevant to the question (which will
usually be the case for a randomly generated utterance, but
can also be checked using a sentence comparison technique
such as HAL or LSA). Intention is shown by both the sarcasm
and the context (which allows listeners to understand that the
speaker is being deliberately difficult).
Maxim of Relevance: Be relevant
Plenty of humour involves non-sequiturs, e.g.:
How many surrealists does it take to change a light-
bulb? Giraffe.6
One large and important category in this area is that of non-
sense jokes. Typically, these jokes consist of nonsensical hap-
penings within a sensible framework. For example:
A man at the dinner table dipped his hands in
the mayonnaise and then ran them through his
hair. When his neighbour looked astonished, the
man apologised: ”I’m so sorry. I thought it was
spinach.”8
Here, the ‘strange act - apology’ framework is sensible; but
the apology is nonsense. Computer generation of this cate-
gory could be difficult, since typically these jokes involves
considerable common-sense knowledge (in order to recog-
nise what is genuinely nonsensical). However it may be that
tractable subsets can be identified.
Maxim of Manner:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
Euphemisms (obscure references to unpleasant/taboo sub-
jects) are a reliable source of humour, although most such
jokes are too obscene to reproduce here. Government eu-
phemisms are also commonly mocked.
Civil Servant: ‘The matter is under consideration’
means we have lost the file. ‘The matter is under
active consideration’ means we are trying to find
the file.9
7Casablanca, M.Burnett & J.Alison.
8Reported by Freud[3].
9Yes Minister, Jonathan Lynn
2. Avoid ambiguity.
Several forms of ambiguity exist, with related jokes: au-
ral (e.g. puns – a form of humour explored in [1]), lexical
(e.g. A man walked into a bar. Ouch.6), grammatical parsing
(e.g. Every minute, somewhere in the world a woman gives
birth. We must find this woman & stop her.6, & anaphora
resolution (e.g. in slapstick comedy: When I nod my head hit
it.6). Expectation failure and surprise only occur if one read-
ing is quite likely and the other highly unlikely. This makes
ambiguity jokes hard to generate reliably, since we cannot
usually judge the relative plausibility of statements (although
one could generate candidate jokes and use a human operator
to filter them).
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary wordiness).
Plenty of jokes are based on unnecessary wordiness. Most
commonly this in the form of long lists (e.g. Monty Python’s
famous parrot sketch rant), but can also be used as a way of
caricaturing certain archetypes (e.g. bureaucrats).
4. Be orderly.
Melchit: Let’s play a word game.
Blackadder: O.K. Rearrange the following words
to make a sentence: Face, Your, Sodding, Shut. 10
4 A Logic for Wit
Based on the idea of intentionally poor communication, we
now develop a set of logical forms that can produce jokes.
We adopt a semi-formal presentation here (i.e. using log-
ical expressions, but without formally defining all the con-
cepts used). It would be premature at this stage to develop
a rigid formalism, as this would probably require adaptation
after further investigation. However, Grice’s maxims are too
informal to be used in computational work without some for-
malisation. We will instead work with a more formal .
4.1 Resources
We note the existence of the following resources:
• Online thesauruses, allowing synonyms and antonyms to
be found.
• WordNet an augmented thesaurus, giving relations such
as ‘X is a kind of Y ’, ‘X is a part-of Y ’.[7]
• Corpuses and statistical corpus analysis tools. These in-
clude co-occurence analysis techniques such as LSA[8]
or HAL[9], and word-scores such as those provided by
the MRC[2].
• We will assume the availability of a parser capable of
converting between logical and natural language forms.
This allows us to focus on logical forms. The issue of
surface language is important, but is largely independent
of the logical analyses we present here.
• We will assume the availability of an inference engine
capable of ‘common sense reasoning’.
Only limited versions are actually available of the last two
resources. The success of joke generation programs will de-
pend to a fair extent on how effectively these limited systems
can be utilised.
10Blackadder II, B.Elton & R.Curtis.
4.2 Notation
For simplicity, we use true/false predicates here. A more so-
phisticated approach might be to use fuzzy logic, allowing
utterances to be slightly poor & slightly funny.
• We introduce the relation suggests, written A Ã B, &
interpreted as “proposition A suggests proposition B”.
This a weaker form of implies, used to capture the mis-
direction which is key to many jokes. In general deter-
mining A Ã B requires real-world human knowledge,
and is therefore beyond current A.I. However we will
identify cases where A Ã B depends only on the logi-
cal form of the joke itself, and these cases form the heart
of this project.
• According to the theory of perspective shifts, order is
important, and this can be seen in the setup/punchline
structure of many jokes. Since the order in which a joke
is told may not be the same as the ordering of elements
in the logical form, we introduce an ordering relation
A − B for “B follows A” or “B is deduced after A”.
Note that A,B need not be well formed formulae.
• Define an utterance skeleton to be an ordered set of for-
mulae fragments, e.g. J = A−B − C.
• Define a joke form to be an utterance skeleton that gives
rise to jokes.
• Write ΓS(t) for the speaker’s knowledge at time t, ΓL(t)
for the listener’s knowledge (or rather, the speaker’s
model of the listener’s knowledge. We will allow knowl-
edge to include counter-factual and hypothetical infor-
mation. If an utterance is ordered A − B, then we have
A ∈ ΓL when B is said.
• Define a measure for the complexity of an utterance:
complexity : utterances → R+. Complexity can
be approximated by sentence length. A more sophisti-
cated measure would take into account the obscurity of
the words (measurable via corpus analysis) and the non-
linearity of the parse-tree.
• Define a predicate deliberately−poor(X). As
noted in §3, intention can be conveyed in many
ways. We do not have a theory for determining
deliberately−poor(X). Instead we present a col-
lection of specific situations where it holds.
• Whilst we will talk of logical relations and inferences,
we must take into account the speed and difficulty of
such calculations. We write !P to mean ‘P can be cal-
culated very quickly (i.e. in the flow of conversation) by
a normal person’. Initially, let us assume that !∃S holds
if complexity(S) is small, and !A |= B if there is a
short proof (e.g. less than 5 steps) in a ‘suitable logic’.
4.3 The maxim of normal communication
We suggest the following axiom is true for normal speech
acts. It can be seen as a mixture of elements of Grice’s max-
ims on quantity plus something of the maxims on Manner.
S is a poor utterance given ΓS ,ΓL, if !∃S′ such that !ΓS |=
S′ (i.e. S′ is true) and !ΓL, S′ |= S, complexity(S′) ¿
complexity(S)
S is a poor utterance given given ΓS ,ΓL, if !∃S′, S′′ such
that !ΓS |= S′ and !ΓL, S′ |= S, S′′, complexity(S′) ≤
complexity(S), relevant(S′′)
Maxim of Normal Communication: In normal communica-
tion, poor utterances only occur by mistake.
This maxim is useful because it identifies utterances that
create expectations which we can reliably predict without so-
phisticated world knowledge:
Corollary: If A is a poor utterance given B ∈ ΓS , then
AÃ B 6∈ ΓS .
4.4 An axiom of wit
We will assume here that there are only three forms of
speech act: information exchange, mistakes, and jokes.
This means that deliberately poor utterances are jokes.
I.e., given an utterance J , if J is a poor utterance and
deliberately−poor(J), then J is a joke. Using this rule,
we now identify a number of joke forms. How funny a joke
is will depend on several aspects (e.g. target, situation, &
surface language) which we do not examine here.
5 Joke Forms
We now identify a number of joke forms which break the ax-
iom of normal communication.
5.1 Obvious tautologies
Simple tautologies11 are a clear violation of the Maxim of
Normal Communication – indeed they are such an obvious
violation as to almost always be intentional. The tautology
can be very simple indeed, if the joke is being used to mock
a stupid character. E.g.
Football Manager: ’Cause football is about noth-
ing, unless it’s about something. And what it is
about -
Interviewer: Yes, yes?
Football Manager: Is football. 12
Stating definitions
One form of tautology-based joke consists of a statement S =
P − Q, where Q is part of the definition of P , and hence Q
is a tautology given that P has already been stated. Examples
include:
It is dangerous to make predictions, especially
about the future.13
Almost all acts of self-abuse are committed by
someone who knows the victim, and these cases are
hardly ever reported.14
Note the presence of parody, quantifier abuse (‘almost all’
used instead of ‘all’ – c.f. §5.2) and taboo-breaking in this
last joke.





Generation: It should be possible to generate such utter-
ances from dictionary definitions. E.g. From “humor, n. 1.
The quality that makes something laughable or amusing; fun-
niness.”15, we could produce “I like humour, especially when
it’s laughable, amusing or funny”. Doing this automatically
involves two stages: Identifying a suitable fragment of the
definition (which might be done by using the MRC to identify
keywords), and constructing an utterance (which could either
be done via a set of templates, or (better) a small generative
grammar for this task). A closely related form is S = P ifQ
where Q ∈ synonyms(P ), as in the joke:
“I could have been smart too if i’d had the brains.”
These jokes should be simple to generate, given either a tem-
plate or grammar system for generating the surface form.
To be, or not to be?
Another form of obvious tautology is S = P ∨ ¬P , as in
Badly Drawn Boy’s non-observation:
Sometimes it feels like my soul is being sucked out
through my arse. And sometimes, it doesn’t.
. Note that P ∨ ¬P can be a speech act meaning “I do
not know”. This means it is not necessarily a poor utter-
ance, unless complexity(P ∨ ¬P ) ¿ complexity(“I do
not know”).
Generation:
Utterances of this form can be created by simply appending
a negation to any utterance P where P is reasonably complex
(so that complexity(P ∨ ¬P ) ¿ complexity(“I do not
know”)). Given the simplicity of this generation mechanism,
we might expect (from the showing-off theory of humour)




The utterance S = ‘∀x ∈ X’ suggests ∃x ∈ X . This
is known as ‘existential import’. Although modern logic
has opted against it, everyday language is ambiguous on the
point: ∀x ∈ ∅ is considered technically correct, but odd. In-
deed, a universally quantified statement strongly suggests the
existence of multiple objects. We can derive this suggestion
from the Maxim of Normal Communication If X = ∅ ∈ ΓS
then let S′ = S′′ =‘X = ∅’. We have complexity(S′) ≤
complexity(S), and we can assume relevant(S′′). Simi-
larly for X = x, stating this would normally be more infor-
mative, and hence should be preferred.
Breaking this suggestion gives rise to joke form J = ∀x ∈
X.P (x) where !X |= |X| < 2, with the parts ordered ∀x −
P (x)− ∈ X in the utterance. Examples include Henry Ford
describing the choice in cars he offered (“Any colour you like
as long as it’s black”), or
Cat: I was with you right up until the beginning.16
Note that if the ordering of the joke fragments was changed
to ∀x− ∈ X−P (x) then we would still have a poor utterance
15First definition returned by www.dictionary.com.
16Red Dwarf, Grant & Naylor.
for X = ∅, but of a different type. It would now be a tautol-
ogy (since for any P , X = ∅ ⇒ ∀x ∈ X.P (x)). However
this would also give jokes (c.f. §5.1). Example instances of
this form of tautology include:
They had nothing. But they were willing to risk it
all.17
Free advice is worth every penny.6
Recognition / Generation: Computer recognition of ei-
ther form of joke will be limited by the limitations of current
parsers, but should otherwise be straightforward. Computer
generation may be harder, requiring some method for gener-
ating situations where these utterances can occur. Generation
will largely be the same for both the expectation-confounding
(∀x− ∈ ∅−P (x)) and the tautology (∀x− ∈ ∅−P (x)) form.
Instances of X where |X| = 1 are easy to create. In-
stances of X = ∅ can be created using ‘basic terms’ for ∅:
“nothing”, “no-one”. They can also be made using A,B such
that A ⇒6 B, since ∅ = {x′s.t.A(x)&B(x)}. Such pairs of
contradictory predicates can be generated from antonyms. If
a related third predicate C(x) can be found, then the inter-
connection may make the resulting joke (either ∀x−C(x)−
x ∈ {x′s.t.A(x)&B(x)} or X = {x′s.t.A(x)&B(x)}.∀x ∈
X.C(x)) funnier.
Alternatively, in an A.I. agent, generation could be done
opportunistically when the conversation presents a suitable
situation.18
Giant exceptions
The statement “Every x but y” suggests that the positive in-
stances greatly outnumber (or are more important than) the
negative ones. This is closely related to the previous class
of jokes, and can also be derived from the Maxim of Nor-
mal Communication. Violating it gives rise to the joke form:
J = ∀x ∈ X/E where |E| ∼ |X|. Examples include:
Oscar Wilde: I can resist anything but temptation.
Doctor: Apart from being dead, there’s nothing
wrong with him.19
Lewis Carroll: I am fond of children - except boys
Everyone agreed, apart from the diehard misogy-
nists (typically 74% of the population).20
Generation / Recognition: These jokes require more
world knowledge than the ‘forall nothing’ class in order to
judge relative sizes / importance. Generation can begin with
the larger category (the main set), and then try to recognise
the possible subsets of this category (e.g. start with ‘chil-
dren’, and deduce children = boys + girls). WordNet has a
relation (hyponyms) for ‘X is a kind of Y’. Unfortunately this
is erratic, including many obscure entries (e.g. ‘changeling’
is a type of child), but the results could be filtered against
frequency of occurrence in a corpus. Dictionary definitions
17Tagline for The Commitments, Roddy Doyle.
18Which is how much of humour occurs, and makes the humour
funnier – c.f. §6.5.
19Day of the Tentacle, published by LucasArts.
20The Algebraist, Iain Banks
could also be used (e.g. using www.dictionary.com,
which combines several dictionaries, gives ‘person’, ‘son’, &
‘daughter’ as the nouns referenced by more than one dictio-
nary when describing ‘children’). Generation could also be-
gin with the exception, and find a superset using WordNet’s
hypernyms relation (e.g. hypernyms of ‘boy’ gives ‘male’
followed by ‘person’ as enclosing categories). Given a main
set and a subset, we can test for the relative size of the subset
using frequency of occurrence in a corpus.
An alternative algorithm involves lists of cases. If the size
of a list is comparable to the number of all possible list en-
tries, then presenting it as a list of exceptions should consti-
tute a joke. This situation could arise in an AI agent reporting
problems (e.g. a mechanic agent reporting faulty car parts
might say “There is nothing wrong with this car apart from
the engine, transmission, brakes & stereo.”).
Exists everything
Statements of the form ∃x ∈ X.P (x) suggest 6 ∀x ∈ X.P (x).
Our theory therefore suggests jokes of the form J = ∃x ∈
X.P (x) where !∀x ∈ X.P (x). This seems to be a rarer class.
One example of such a joke is:
Politician: ...which will result in nuclear holocaust.
Now some people might say that’s a bad thing... 21
5.3 Contradictions
Stating P − Q where !P ⇒ ¬Q is a poor utterance.
We can derive this from the Maxim of Normal Commu-
nication using ⊥ ⇒ P&¬P and complexity(⊥) ¿
complexity(P&¬P ) – especially if complexity(P ) is
large. It is also a violation of Grice’s maxim of quality (c.f.
§3.1). The finest examples of this class are those jokes that
are both contradictory and self-justifying:
Saul Gorn: I am a firm believer in optimism, be-
cause without optimism, what else is there?
There are 3 types of mathematician: those who can
count and those who can’t.6
Unfortunately, they are also likely to be very hard to gen-
erate.
Oxymorons
A much easier class of contradiction is the use of oxymorons
– when a modifier is combined with a contradictory object.
E.g.
Tom Lehrer: The Harvard mathematics department
was a hotbed of celibacy.
Generation: Given a noun P , we can generate an oxymoron
by selectingQ ∈ antonyms(P ) then finding adjectiveA such
that A−Q is common, but A−P is either nonexistent or very
rare (this would be done using a corpus). The sentence frag-
ment A−P should be an oxymoron. Alternatively, we could
find adjectives A,B such that B ∈ antonyms(A) and B−P
is common whilst A−P is rare. These two methods are basi-
cally equivalent, but likely to return different utterances, giv-
ing a wider range for selection. Oxymorons involving verbs
21Not The 9 O’Clock News, BBC.
and adverbs can similarly be generated. We suspect that oxy-
morons are always recognisable as jokes rather than mistakes,
so signalling intention is not necessary.
Conjunction of conflicting statements
Another form of joke, closely related to contradiction is the
juxtaposition of conflicting statements. For example:
The Texan turned out to be good-natured, generous
and likable. In three days no one could stand him.22
Nately had a bad start. He came from a good
family.22
Conflicting utterances should be straightforward to gener-
ate. However showing that such statements are not mistakes
may be harder. In the examples above, what identifies these
utterances as jokes rather than junk is that, although the state-
ments are in conflict, they can be resolved to give a satisfac-
tory explanation. This is likely to be difficult to formalise,
and so it may not be possible to reliably generate such jokes.
5.4 Convoluted statement
There are jokes based around breaking the Gricean axioms of
manner: (1) “Never use a big word when a diminutive alter-
native would suffice.”, (2) “Don’t more use words than neces-
sary; it’s highly superfluous”6 (note that both of these maxims
can be deduced from the Maxim of Normal Communication).
This is an interesting class of jokes as it seems particularly
well suited to computerisation. However such utterances can
be mistaken for the accidental overly-detailed statements of a
bore. They are therefore unlikely to be funny unless the hu-
morous intention can clearly be conveyed. This can be done
if (a) the utterance is delivered by an agent playing up to some
suitable caricature (e.g. an officious bureaucrat, or a pompous
pseudo-intellectual), or (b) the convolution is pushed to ex-
tremes (limited by producing an utterance that is still intelli-
gible to the normal listener). This second case is particularly
applicable when trying to express what the speaker feels is an
important point to someone who is not listening.
Generation
Excessive detail can be generated by replacing generic terms
with specific ones (found via WordNet), and/or inserting ex-
tra adjective phrases. The simple tactic of replacing a single
adjective with a string of synonyms should be quite effective.
Obscure wording can be created by using a thesaurus to find
synonyms, ranked by frequency-in-a-corpus.
5.5 Double negatives
Stating ¬¬P for P is a clear breach of normal communica-
tion, but it is also rather artificial unless disguised. Sarcasm
is one such disguise.
Generation: We have implemented a system for convert-
ing between normal and sarcastic comments in simple sen-
tences. This uses a shallow parse to identify the adjective in
a phrase. A thesaurus is then used to find antonyms, which
are ranked using the imageablity rating from the MRC Psy-
cholinguistic Database. Preliminary tests suggest this is quite
22Catch 22, J.Heller.
effective. For example, “You look terrible” becomes “[sarcas-
tic] You look wonderful”. Conversely, the same process will
produce un-sarcastic versions of sarcastic statements. Here
the meaningfulness rating is more appropriate for determin-
ing word-choice. With this, “[sarcastic] You look wonderful”
becomes “You look poor”. Preliminary experiments suggest
that this system is quite robust for simple sentences and com-
mon terms. However the MRC scoring was needed to avoid
the selection of obscure/weak substitutions.
Inappropriate metaphors
There is a more sophisticated form of double-negative, where
a metaphors uses a negative example to imply a negative
statement. E.g. using “savage as a gerbil” for “not savage”.
A good, if unrepeatable, example of this is Douglas Adam’s
meta-metaphor: “The big yellow somethings hung in the air
in almost exactly the way that bricks don’t.”
Generation: Inappropriate metaphors could be generated
using the following process. Given the target statement ¬P
(where P is an adjective):
• Find an antonym Q of P using a thesaurus.
• Find an exemplar23 X of Q. Finding exemplars should
be possible using co-occurrence techniques and a dic-
tionary to identify nouns. For example, LSA – which
links words that occur in similar contexts and can list
the most-strongly linked – should be appropriate here.
These two steps will give many possible choices for X .
One way of rating examples would be to use the MRC
meaningfulness score forQ, the strength of link between
X and Q, and the MRC imageablity score of X – com-
bined by multiplication.
• This gives the humorous description “As P as an X”.
6 Future Work
6.1 Implementation & testing
The obvious next stage in developing this work is to imple-
ment the algorithms we describe. This would allow them to
be tested. Hopefully this would validate the ideas we have
presented – but however successful an implementation is, it
is sure to suggest areas for improvement.
6.2 More joke forms
We have identified a set of joke forms based around inten-
tionally poor communication. However it is unlikely that this
is an exhaustive set. Further exploration of the idea of inten-
tionally poor communication will probably lead to more such
joke forms being identified.
6.3 Formalisation
If implementation and testing are successful, then we should
try to formalise the theory. In particular, it would be interest-
ing to try and automatically derive the individual joke forms
from a formal statement of the idea of intentionally poor com-
munication. This could also prompt the identification of new
joke forms.
23A typical example.
6.4 A richer theory of discourse
In this paper, we assumed that there were only three types of
speech acts (information exchange, mistakes, and jokes). A
richer theory of discourse (i.e. one containing more speech
acts, and relating these to human interaction) would allow us
to filter out some non-jokes, and should allow us to identify
more joke forms.
6.5 Measuring funniness
In this paper we have only considered what makes an utter-
ance into a joke. We have not examined what makes some
jokes funnier than others. Developing a metric to measure
the funniness of a joke will be important to most applications
of computational humour. There are many factors involved
in this – including some that are personal to an individual.
Below we mention three factors that seem potentially well-
suited to computer modelling.
Relevance
Wit is characteristically spontaneous, generated in response
to the flow of conversation, and is considerably funnier as
a result. This phenomenon can be seen as a result of the
showing-off theory of humour (c.f. §2.1). This suggests that
wit should be generated within situations, rather than pre-
sented as stand-alone jokes, and it’s funniness can partly be
judged by the relevance of the witty comment to the current
context. This can be measured by using a co-occurence tech-
nique to compare the witty statement with recent conversa-
tion.
Taboos
Jokes that break social taboos are generally funnier, albeit
riskier (e.g. an absurd rude adjective will probably be funnier
than a merely absurd adjective). Although taboos are very
complex psychological phenomenon (varying strongly be-
tween cultures), they may be reasonably susceptible to crude
automated metrics. Certain subjects are reliably shrouded in
taboos: sexual affairs, the scatalogical (toilet-related) and vi-
olence. These subjects typically use an identifiable set of
words/concepts. Hence a simple metric for whether a joke
is taboo-breaking would simply look for taboo-related key-
words.
This also suggests a simple formulae for generating taboo-
breaking concepts: link a taboo term to an anti-taboo term
(i.e. a symbol of purity): e.g. “nun-punching”, “kick-boxing
granny”, “bishop-shit”, etc.
Parody
An element of parody (mimicking a well-known person, sit-
uation or form of utterance) can greatly strengthen a joke’s
appeal. This is for several reasons. Parody strengthens false-
suggestions, emphasises the absurd (by providing a contrast-
ing real-world example), increases the cleverness of a joke,
and mocks the original person/situation/utterance. Although
it is ambitious, we might hope to use statistical corpus analy-
sis to both recognise and generate parody.
7 Conclusion
We have found a relatively abstract form of humour that is po-
tentially computationally tractable. This is the class of jokes
and witty statements which draw their humour from delib-
erately breaking the rules of normal conversation – a class
of humour we summarise as ingeniously poor communica-
tion. Our analysis is based on the perspective-shift theory of
jokes. We present an overarching framework for this: that
jokes emerged as a means of publicly displaying intelligence.
This can be justified on evolutionary grounds, as an instance
of mate selection forces.
The work presented here is in a preliminary stage, and there
is clearly much more to be done. Hopefully the algorithm
schemes we have described here will prove successful when
implemented. If so this work will considerably extend the
range of computational humour. It contains many limitations.
Yet if we are optimistic, these too may advance the field by
spurring future developments. After the pioneering work of
Binstead & Ritchie on puns, creative computational humour
has languished. This is a shame, as it is clearly an area of
great interest and possibility. Perhaps more than anything,
what this field needs is fresh work.
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